One particularly serious criticism of Karl Rahner’s fundamental theology on postmodern grounds has been articulated by Francis Schüssler Fiorenza. Specifically, Fiorenza criticizes the mystagogical or “maieutic” aspect of Rahner’s method, its alleged progression from implicit experience to explicit historical concretions. This characteristic, in Fiorenza’s estimation, legitimates those who level a claim of tautology against the transcendental method. Furthermore, Fiorenza argues that the maieutic character of Rahner’s transcendental method undercuts truly historical questions. The key problem with assessing Fiorenza’s critique of Rahner (...) is primarily Fiorenza’s imprecision with his use of terms. Two questions in particular remain unresolved. First, which foundationalism is the supposed foundationalism present in Rahner’s method? Second, whose conception of hermeneutics is included under the rubric of “hermeneutics"? In this paper I argue that Rahner executes a truly hermeneutical theological method that escapes Fiorenza’s foundationalist critique. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Karl Rahner’s theological method, properly understood as a method of transcendental hermeneutics, overcomes the impasse in contemporary theology between foundationalist and nonfoundationalist methods. Though Rahner is indeed a metaphysical foundationalist, his method is nevertheless epistemologically nonfoundational. In short, Rahner’s understanding of the radical contingency of subjectivity disallows the possibility of reliance on certain and indubitable principles of knowledge. I contend that an understanding of the nonfoundational elements of Rahner’s method will point towards the continued (...) relevance of his method for our present period. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Karl Rahner’s theological method, properly understood as a method of transcendental hermeneutics, overcomes the impasse in contemporary theology between foundationalist and nonfoundationalist methods. Though Rahner is indeed a metaphysical foundationalist, his method is nevertheless epistemologically nonfoundational. In short, Rahner’s understanding of the radical contingency of subjectivity disallows the possibility of reliance on certain and indubitable principles of knowledge. I contend that an understanding of the nonfoundational elements of Rahner’s method will point towards the continued (...) relevance of his method for our present period. (shrink)